

AMERICAN NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-04-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Program Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE American Nation Building in Afghanistan				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) COL Richard L. Phillips				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) COL Ricky Streight Department of Distance Education				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT DISTRIBUTION A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
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15. SUBJECT TERMS Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), Combine Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), International Security Force (ISAF)					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNLIMITED	32	

USAWC PROGRAM RESEARCH PROJECT

AMERICAN NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

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Topic Approved By
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Richard L. Phillips

TITLE: American Nation Building in Afghanistan

FORMAT: Program Research Project

DATE: 18 April 2009 WORD COUNT: 5,323 PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), Combine Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), International Security Force (ISAF).

Nation building efforts in Afghanistan depend on three pillars, securing the country, building the economy and establishing good governance. Each is dependent on the other. Coordinating the international efforts to achieve each pillar's goals is a daunting task. Coalition countries maintain separate and individual agendas that impede coordinated nation building efforts. Corruption is wide spread and threatens national security and the government legitimacy. Little or no oversight of government activities provides minimal opportunity to mitigate corruption. Implementation of internal control measures, at all levels of government with international committee and coalition supervision, is necessary. The narcotics trade contributes to security and corruption issues. Poor economic conditions provide ready recruits for the insurgency and cause the people to question the legitimacy of the government. Afghan National Security Force trainers and mentors are critically short. Filling these shortages must become a priority. Although the country is on the path to democratic reform, greater assurance of success requires more assistance with better coordination of effort and time. If we fail to do this, then the last seven years may foretell decades of additional effort.

AMERICAN NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is on the path to democratic reform but more resources, assistance, better coordination, and time are necessary. The three pillars for successful nation building in Afghanistan are security, good governance and economic development. To achieve United States (US) strategic interests in the region, the coalition must promote positive economic development, security, successful stabilization of the government and the people's acceptance of that government. This paper identifies current US national strategic interests and goals in Afghanistan, the status of nation building and stability operations, current development plans for Afghan security forces, plans for future development, and recommendations for the future.

For the past seven years, the international community and the US have worked diligently to reform Afghanistan. Efforts have produced many successes and many hard lessons; the future will bring more of each. Senator Joseph Biden, in December 2001, likened the nation building efforts planned for Afghanistan to the European recovery plan (Marshall Plan) which provided financial assistance for European reconstruction following World War II.¹ During the initial years, the Marshall Plan infused almost 13 billion dollars into 18 war torn European countries. Its primary goal was to restore European confidence in their economies and restore hope for the future.² The primary assumption was that economic stability would promote political stability.³

The situational environment and cultural issues of Afghanistan bear little similarity to that of post World War II Europe. European nations at the end of World War II still had viable governmental and economic structure. They possessed a national culture and interdependence within the country and region. Afghanistan does not enjoy

these similarities. Mere infusion of billions of dollars to stimulate and develop the economy will not result in the successes experienced by the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan.⁴ Senator Biden was correct in one respect in his comparison; the Marshall Plan required substantial commitment of time and resources. Afghanistan will require even more. Building Afghanistan as a nation and a partner will be a long and expensive endeavor. The best adage for the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and America is, "Rome wasn't built in a day." LTG Karl Eikenberry (Commander of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan), at his change of command ceremony, described the situation in Afghanistan as different; a kind of war, a war where military forces build schools, clinics, and roads and seek to help the Afghan people reclaim the middle ground of civil society. His recipe for success was an investment of more time, patience, and commitment.⁵

Seven years after the US invasion, the future of Afghanistan is in a perilous state. Corruption that threatens economic development and national security is rampant at all levels of the government.⁶ It affects security and stability operations at every level. Yet when the Afghan president, Hamid Karazi, was recently asked about the effects of corruption he argued it was the result of the international presence; a problem created by the vast capital infusion.⁷ Evidence suggests that rampant corruption is effectively turning the people against the government. Recent interviews with local Afghan leaders, as late as September 2008, suggest corruption is turning the people to their only alternative, the Taliban. One leader, an admitted Taliban leader, suggested the

people were fed up with the government's lack of honesty and if the government would work to provide the people with a good life and a job there would be no one here following the Taliban leader (Mullah Omar).⁸

The people's dissatisfaction with the government is exacerbated by the collateral damage caused by kinetic operations directed against the insurgency. Civilian casualties and coalition searches of Afghan homes, divert attention, both internationally and internally, from the many successful civil reconstruction programs and combat operations. The result is further discontent with the government. The Afghan president has been compelled politically and morally to denounce searches of Afghan homes by coalition soldiers and the seemingly irresponsible use of Close Air Support (CAS) in Afghanistan.⁹ He has issued multiple demands for revision of status of forces agreements and immediate and strict regulation of the use of CAS within Afghanistan.¹⁰ The immediate impact of these restrictions places both international and Afghan forces in even greater danger. Additionally, continued home searches and arrests by coalition forces result in even more allegations of civilian maltreatment and casualties. Mistaken detentions, unintentional killings, property damage, unauthorized entry, and insensitivity to cultural convention are all elements that undermine the legitimacy of the government and nation building efforts. The Taliban/Al Qaeda networks seize the Information Operations (IO) opportunity and quickly and effectively exploit it.

Thus, despite the numerous successes of the coalition, very real and very dangerous obstacles remain. Combined with the increasing presence and activities of the Taliban, it is imperative that improved strategies, economic growth, government stability, and regional security be achieved to ensure success.

US Strategic Interests in Afghanistan

On October 7, 2001 the US-led invasion of Afghanistan ushered in 21st century warfare; the first campaign of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The overarching US strategic goal of GWOT was to prevent further attacks by Al Qaeda or other global terrorist groups in or on the United States.¹¹ The stated purpose for the attacks in Afghanistan was to close terrorist training camps, capture terrorists and their support personnel in Afghanistan, and deny Afghanistan as a base of operations for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.¹²

US strategic interests in Afghanistan present more than merely denial of the country for terrorist use. The US strategic goals in Afghanistan are to destroy Al Qaeda (Al Qaeda was headquartered in Afghanistan in 2001) and to establish Afghanistan as the staging base for attacks against Al Qaeda in Pakistan.¹³ At a strategic partnership meeting in September 2006 the stated strategic mission was defined as:

“with coalition partner support, to support the development of an independent, stable and secure Afghanistan, to eliminate regional support for international terrorism, to defeat international terrorism and the insurgency regionally and expand security while developing an effective and enduring Afghan National Security Force.”¹⁴

US efforts will ensure national development and elimination of narcotics production. Finally, upon successful development of security and governmental institutions, transition efforts to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA). Success is defined as the establishment of a self-reliant and secure Afghanistan committed to representative government, national development, respect for the rule of law, a partner in regional stability, and rejection of international terrorism.¹⁵

The GIRoA strategic goals are slightly different but similar. The GIRoA goals are to ensure development of a stable, moderate government, development of a security force capable of taking charge of its own security, building democratic institutions suitable for Afghanistan and ensuring continued international presence until those goals are achieved.¹⁶ GIRoA seeks to establish itself as a partner in GWOT, integrated into the long-term strategy and capable of controlling its own territory.¹⁷

Nation Building Efforts October 2001 to 2009

By December 2001, the Taliban government had abandoned Afghanistan and the United States, with assistance from the international community, found itself leading the first nation building effort of the 21st century. Initial recruiting for the Afghan National Army (ANA) began in December 2001 and the first ANA battalion (kandak) was trained and deployed in support of security operations by March 2003.¹⁸ Agreements made in Bonn, Germany set in motion international initiatives to secure and rebuild Afghanistan.¹⁹ These included formation of an interim government, provisions for financial assistance, establishment of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and training responsibilities, Afghanistan's acceptance of International security forces (ISAF) within its national boundaries, and a date for free elections – October 9, 2004.²⁰ The ANSF (comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)), initial size was 132,000 soldiers and policemen (the strength was based more on available funding than a requirement based on a threat assessment²¹); the ANA size – 70,000; ANP – 62,000.²² In September 2008, approval was given to increase the ANSF to 216,000; ANA to 134,000; ANP to 82,000.²³

2001 – 2005

Initial efforts to build the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the police capability (ANP) fell to the US State Department and Germany. The German Police Project Office (GPPO) began training the police.²⁴ The US Army was assigned the lead to train and equip the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the ANA. ISAF/OEF would secure the country until the ANSF was capable.²⁵ The Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan (OMC-A), in accordance with the Bonn agreements, assumed responsibility for recruiting, training and equipping the ANA on May 17, 2002. Between 2001 and 2005 the ANA growth was admirable; MoD/GS HQs and five corps (8 brigades with 40 kandaks; total strength – 34,688 personnel, 49.55% of authorized strength).²⁶

The GPPO set about development of the ANP. It developed a simultaneous training program for Police leadership (commissioned officers and Non-commissioned officers) and local law enforcement. The plan focused at building strong leadership. The training was lengthy, commissioned officers course was three years and the non-commissioned officers nine months; local police was eight weeks of instruction.²⁷ By 2005, the ANP strength was approximately 35,000. MoI/ANP development lagged the MoD/ANA by almost three years.²⁸

On July 12, 2005, the OMC-A was reorganized and became OSC-A (Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan) and assumed responsibility for development of the MoI/ANP as well as the MoD/ANA.²⁹ On April 4, 2006 OSC-A was re-designated Coalition Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and assumed the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) mission.³⁰

2006 – 2009

By 2006, the focus of police development shifted from training to reinforcing training through mentoring.³¹ The model for the ANA development was, train, equip and employ³². Assessments of the environment led CSTC-A, MoI and MoD to recommend increases in both ANA and ANP force structure; the ANSF size was inadequate. At the 2006 Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB), the ANSF was approved to grow to 162,000 (ANA to 80,000; the ANP to 82,000).³³ By the end of the year CSTC-A reported ANA strength at 30,400 and the ANP at 50,700.³⁴

In 2007, to counter leadership deficiencies in police training and leadership CSTC-A proposed a drastic change – Focused District Development (FDD). FDD, a process to further reform the ANP, allows CSTC-A to assess, train, mentor, and validate ANP at the district level. An entire ANP force is withdrawn from its district and sent to an external training site (elsewhere in Afghanistan) where it trains as a unit. Upon completion of FDD, the police are reinserted into their district. The intent of FDD is to remove the “bad cops” via a vetting process, create unit cohesion, increase capability and instill confidence. FDD has become CSTC-A's main effort with the police.³⁵ The process is still in its infancy and CSTC-A expects evolution and adjustment in the program as it progresses. It is too early to tell if FDD will solve the issues with police development.³⁶ FDD had yet to produce any graduates by the end of 2007. By the end of 2007 the ANP strength had grown to 73,611 and the ANA was 47, 921.³⁷

At the 2007, President of the United States (POTUS) brief CSTC-A reported disturbing figures for their Embedded Training Teams (ETT) staffing. Of the required 110 ETTs, for Corps and below, only 44% were filled; the availability above Corps was

only 45%. ISAF Operations Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) were at 69% of the number promised (103 OMLTs were required).³⁸ Mentorship for the Mol was even worse. Of the required 450 Police Mentor Teams (PMT) less than 37% were filled.³⁹

In 2008, as Anti-Government/Coalition Forces (ACF) activity increased and casualty rates grew, CSTC-A recommended another increase in ANSF force structure; the ANA would grow an additional 54,000 to 134,000.⁴⁰ By the October 2008 POTUS brief, the MoD/ANA strength was reported at 66,867 and the Mol/ANP was 78,599. Forty-two ANP units had graduated FDD and training capability had grown to accommodate up to 1,800 students.⁴¹ The international community agreed to fund ANSF growth to 216,000. CSTC-A would accelerate ANA development plan to add an additional 19 battalions (kandaks) and 5 separate companies by the end of 2009.⁴² ETT fill rate for Corps and below was 49.7%, above Corps 56.1%; ISAF OMLT fill was 74% and PMT coverage had dropped to under 32%.⁴³

At issue is the CSTC-A Joint Manning Document (JMD) and the ISAF charter. ISAF's role in the development of the ANA is to assist the Afghan Government and the G8 Partner Nations to bring the ANA to full self-sufficiency by operational mentoring, facilitating continuation of training and supporting the ANA units to increase their capability and reach. This is done primarily with OMLTs and the USA equivalent, Embedded Training Teams (ETT).⁴⁴ There is no mention of support to the police or Mol. The CSTC-A JMD has not changed since the command was OMC-A.⁴⁵ Mentorship to the police requires operational restructuring (robbing Peter to pay Paul) and additional manning requests of Department of Defense.⁴⁶ Each increase in ANSF force structure exacerbates the problem. When NATO was asked regarding the OMLT preparation

and fielding requirements the answer was, “it takes between 9 and 18 months to prepare an OMLT for deployment”.⁴⁷

Coordination

According to Brigadier General Alan Howard (Canada), CSTC-A, Assistant Commanding General for ANA Development, one of the key challenges to the mission in Afghanistan is a lack of a common strategic vision, a vision that will reinvigorate efforts with unified and attainable goals⁴⁸. Failure to achieve a common strategic vision hampers development at all levels: security, governance, economic development, counter narcotics efforts, and relations with Afghanistan's bordering nations. The myriad of actors in the country further exacerbates efforts and obscures the goals and objectives, which because of the inability to agree on a strategic direction, confuse efforts and, many times, are contradictory. Unity of command and effort is the answer to many of the problems. Unfortunately, each country or international agency pursues its own agenda; there are too many directors, too many uncoordinated activities. A new comprehensive strategic plan, developed cooperatively among the U.S., NATO, the UN, the EU, and the Afghan government, that involves both military and civilian aspects of mission accomplishment, is necessary to achieve strategic unity.⁴⁹ However, as important as the plan is, execution brings success.⁵⁰

The NATO/ISAF mission is comprised of 41 member nations.⁵¹ Operational alignment facilitates further divergence of objectives. Currently, the international security assistance is, for all intent and purpose, divided along national lines; Germans in the North, Spanish and Italian in the West, Americans in the East and Central, French in the Capital, and the British and Canadians with some Romanian, Dutch, and Polish

assistance in the South; all under somewhat contentious command. These regional/national divisions create interesting challenges as each nation seeks to achieve its national interests, many of which run counter to those of the US and even the Afghan government. Achieving strategic unity is critical but clearly a daunting endeavor.

As earlier stated, the three pillars for successful nation building in Afghanistan are security, good governance and economic development. Good governance is responsive to the people, a good steward of resources, and provides a safe and productive environment. Economic development and growth are products of good governance and provides funding for national security. Security promotes and creates a stable environment within which economic, social, and political initiatives can thrive and is indicative of a strong government. The three are interdependent. Failure at one is failure at all.

Development of the ANSF is progressing well. Many challenges exist, but the ANSF continues to grow in both capability and number. The Army is currently involved in almost every operation in the country and has assumed the lead role in over 50 percent of security operations.⁵² The ANP is employed in virtually every district in the country and the nation's borders are protected by a special force, the Afghan Border Patrol (ABP). The achievement of security in the country is progressing well.

Governance and economic development lag far behind. The government, at all levels, is rife with corruption. The economy is non-existent save for poppies and stimulus from the international communities. The US and the international community must apply equal focus at the economy and governance to ensure success. US contributions

between 2001 and 2008 reveal a widening disparity in commitments; security – \$17.2 billion, governance – \$1.3 billion and economic growth – \$7.7 billion.⁵³

The keys to success in Afghanistan

The security situation in Afghanistan is evolving and 2008 has proved to be a costly year as insurgent attacks rose in number and intensity. ISAF, ANSF and OEF forces are engaged daily.⁵⁴ Threat assessments have led to petitions to increase the size of the ANA.⁵⁵ Calls for increase in international security force strength are being headed.⁵⁶ Equipping the ANSF is progressing at a rapid pace. The ANSF is acquiring additional combat capability, NATO weapons, MI-17 and 35 helicopters, the latest version of the up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), 81mm mortars, new (refurbished) D-30 120mm howitzers and in FY2010 refurbished Boeing C-27A transport aircraft.⁵⁷

At the outset of 2008, ISAF renewed the operational objectives “shape, clear, hold and rebuild.”⁵⁸ Shaping is ensuring the local leaders understand the motivation behind positioning combat forces in their town or district. Clearing is eradicating AFC influence in the area. Holding is positioning sufficient force in the area to deny ACF return and facilitate Humanitarian Assistance for the people. Rebuild is improvement of infrastructure, facilities and governance. It is an international/DoS mission with military support. Currently ISAF and ANSF forces are insufficient to meet the requirements to “hold” the areas of strategic importance, which places the rebuild phase in jeopardy. Should a local leadership and community embrace the coalition and government presence serious repercussions result should government/coalition forces deploy elsewhere, permitting the ACF to return, reverse development and building initiatives,

as well as punish the people for cooperating with the government/coalition forces. The legitimacy of both the government and the coalition is brought into question, and success in other districts is jeopardized. Without adequate “holding” forces, all benefits of the shaping and clearing phases are lost. More forces are needed; both ANSF and ISAF. The current security force commitment is inadequate to meet the need. CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD have sought and gained agreement to expand the ANA to 134,000.⁵⁹ The current CSTC-A/MoD growth plan has a target year of 2011 and accelerates growth by eight additional Infantry kandaks, beyond the 11 already planned, by the end of 2009.⁶⁰ The expansion of the combat capability of the ANSF results in greater demand for ETT/PMTs. CSTC-A and ISAF trainer and mentor team demands will increase along with additional equipment requirements. In the immediate near-term, to ensure success at the “shape, clear hold and rebuild” operations, ISAF/USFOR-A must increase capability (combat power, PRT and ETT/OMLT).

The ANSF will eventually gain the capability to secure the majority of Afghanistan, which will allow the size of ISAF to shrink to sustainment support level requirements. True long-term security requires investment to provide for the people, not just kinetic capabilities. A similar commitment, in both funds and functional expertise, to develop governmental systems and economy is necessary.

The United States, through CSTC-A, in Fiscal Year 2007, poured almost 8 billion dollars into developing the combat capabilities of the ANSF.⁶¹ The combined international contributions, to develop ANSF capabilities, exceed those of the US.⁶² Investments in economic development and governmental legitimacy (reduction of corruption) have not received similar attention.⁶³

Good Governance

MG Robert Cone, Commander of CSTC-A, 2007 – 2008, at the top of his areas of concern suggesting that without good government, economic growth will fail, security will degenerate and all investment in the country is a waste.⁶⁴ Government corruption is spiraling out of control. Sixty percent of Afghans perceive government of Afghanistan as more corrupt than the Taliban, Mujahedeen or the Communist periods. They perceive corruption at virtually every level of their society.⁶⁵ Interviews with local leaders suggest a dismal perception. The government is weak and corrupt, American soldiers do not respect the culture; security is the worst that it has been for years.⁶⁶

The narcotics trade and eradication efforts further erodes the government legitimacy. The Afghan constitution charges the government to prevent narcotics trade. In the preamble, the state is directed to prevent terrorist activities, production and consumption of intoxicants (*musakkirat*), and production and smuggling of narcotics.⁶⁷

Estimates suggest that approximately 90 percent of the world's illegal opium comes from Afghanistan's illicit narcotics trade.⁶⁸ Afghan police, political leaders, and the ACF all provide protection to the growers and traffickers.⁶⁹ Competition for this income motivates much violence and funds corruption. Narcotics trade corrupts and weakens the government, undermines legitimate economic development, and funds the insurgency. Unfortunately as there are few income alternatives from the point of view of poppy cultivators. To them, it is poppy eradication efforts that bring insecurity and violence, while the corrupt politicians and Taliban, who resist the eradication efforts that provide security.⁷⁰

At both CSTC-A and ISAF there is an unanswered and persistent question, ‘who mentors the government?’ CSTC-A provides mentors to MoD and Mol, no dedicated mentors exist for the other ministries, the President or the regional/provincial/district governors (the CFC-A, ISAF, and AFCOM commanders have mentored or counseled the President but no formal mentor relationship has yet been established).

The Commander of CSTC-A has targeted control of corruption as a primary focus. The command seeks additional structure to mitigate the effects; functional expertise at controlling corruption.⁷¹ Initiation of payroll by electronic transfer of funds for both the ANA and ANP, effectively taking control of payroll distribution away from local government officials; pay that rarely got to the individual, has already had positive effect. However, corruption extends well beyond just Mol and MoD pay roll practices. Corruption invades every area of Afghanistan from economic development to security. To reduce corruption attitudes toward it must change. Some view corruption as a result of availability, suggesting that when that much money is in front of an Afghan, he will always take some.⁷²

Economic growth

Afghan unemployment is 40%; the primary national product is poppies. The effects of corruption impede economic development at the lowest socioeconomic levels. The inability of the economy to provide employment drives many to the ranks of the Taliban and the narcotics trade. The poor economy threatens the nation. For many, the only way to survive is to join the Taliban or resort to crime, the poppy and opium trade.⁷³

Coalition efforts at poppy eradication are often viewed as an attack on the only revenue source of many average Afghans. Many Afghans believe that poppy cultivation while undesirable is inevitable; there are few economic alternatives.⁷⁴ Afghan farmers cultivate poppies because, for most, it is the only way to supplement their income; it is necessary, there is limited rural economic base. Pursuing eradication without delivering economic alternatives will only drive more Afghans away from the government⁷⁵.

Poppy production in 2005 was estimated at 4,479 metric tons. By 2006, production had risen to 5,644 metric tons. By 2007, the production was estimated at 8,200 metric tons. Afghanistan is the world leader in opium production. Afghan opium makes its way to Russia and Europe and eventually the US.⁷⁶

There is no evidence of comprehensive economic development efforts. Investment in economic development is at best secondary to security.⁷⁷ This failed economic development policy provides the insurgency a ready platform to fuel public resentment and exacerbates narcotics problems, which affect security operations. Failure to provide viable employment opportunities along with security and economic stimulus further erodes the legitimacy of the government. The people, without alternatives, turn to their only source of income, the Taliban and the crime syndicates. Without focus at economic development, efforts at security fail, government is undermined and nation-building efforts are futile.

Recommendations

Reduce Corruption [impacts good governance]

Corruption in Afghanistan exists on many levels: graft, misappropriation of funds, purchasing “knock-off” products, bribes, narcotics money, and several the West has

never conceived. Corruption cannot be eliminated; it cannot in the US and it will not in Afghanistan. The goal is to minimize the affects and opportunity.

CSTC-A and the international community can seek some reduction by implementing strict control measures and accountability systems monitored by international committee and coalition mentors. More mentors (ETT/PMT/OMLT) at all levels to guide, observe and report corruption are necessary. Additional efforts at installing a viable legal system that results in conviction and imprisonment, a system, equally applied without regard to position, status or nationality.⁷⁸ With a legal system of this sort, Afghanistan will possess the capability to effectively enforce and hold accountable those who engage in corrupt activities. International contribution, in the form of civilian legal expertise is necessary.

Poppy eradication- counter-narcotics measures [impacts security and economy].

Poppy eradication without an alternative income source is counter productive and potentially contributes to the insurgency and narcotics industry. A potential strategy follows:

1. Start with information operation purporting supporting counter-narcotics efforts enhances the livelihoods of the people.
2. Provide a dependable alternative income source.
3. Provide an income replacement incentive (for the reduce income due to rejecting poppy cultivation) while delivering an alternative that provides an even larger income.
4. Deliver the alternative without threat of force.

5. The Afghan government, NATO, and the Coalition undertake interdiction efforts that include the removing corrupt officials.

6. Provide security against drug trade attacks.

7. Reorganize the Ministry of the Interior, not just reform, a top to bottom reorganization.

Start in provinces that do not produce poppies or are reducing production. Incentives and alternative income source should secondarily go to poppy producing provinces. The alternative income crop must provide all the same infrastructure as the poppy industry (future contracts, guaranteed marketing, financing, and technical assistance). A commitment to long-term success of the alternative crop, it may take several years to turn a profit. The program will only be successful when Afghans themselves believe the crop is reliable and dependable. The goal is to provide a dependable alternative to poppies as part of the eradication plan. One without the other will not work.⁷⁹

More troops [impacts security]

The US and international community must provide a temporary increase in combat capability. This additional capability must focus at counterinsurgent operations (COIN). The implied task is a comprehensive COIN strategy for Afghanistan. This has not yet been achieved.

The ANSF is gaining capability, but is not yet capable of assuming the security responsibilities. The increase in ACF activities and attacks stretches ANSF and ISAF capability even further. Efforts to develop the ANSF capability must continue and accelerate to meet the situational requirements. In the interim US/ISAF must commit to

fill the capability gaps. The ANSF at 216,000 is still insufficient to provide adequate security for Afghanistan without significant international assistance. Minister Rahim Wardak (Afghan Minister of Defense) persistently proffers that established force structure is not based on analysis of security requirements for Afghanistan but rather on a willingness/capability of the international communities to resource. The minister and his ANA General Staff suggest the Army strength should be closer to 250,000 (he makes no estimates regarding the police)⁸⁰.

Operational adjustments [impacts good governance and security]

Coordination of effort, between all forces in Afghanistan, is critical to success. Unilateral actions, on the part of any force (ANSF, ISAF and OEF) many times result in unacceptable impacts. Specifically, unilateral actions on the part of coalition forces undermine the legitimacy of the ANSF and the government. Joint coordinated efforts, that include consideration of the Afghan strategic goals, represent the way ahead.⁸¹ Successful counterinsurgency missions, with Afghans in the lead role, indicate a capable Afghan government capable of securing the country. Operations not led by ANSF, successful or not, undermine the government. Combat missions that result in civilian casualties, successful or not, feed the ACF IO campaign. They undermine the international mission and the government, draw very harsh criticism from the Afghan people and turn them against both the coalition and the Karzai administration.

1. *Control the employment of combat power.* Reduction of civilian casualties by US/ISAF controlled assets/forces is imperative. The western powers have grown reluctant to risk the lives of soldiers in what used to be normal procedure (fire and maneuver) if an alternative engagement means is available; 'fall back, drop a 2000

pound JADAM', is becoming the norm. In May 2007, after a civilian casualty incident in Farah province, the President, the Minister, the ANA Chief of Staff and the G3 questioned COMISAF (then GEN McNeil) regarding the definition of proportional response. When three people run to a building after shooting at you, is it proportional to drop 2000-pound bombs on the house and kill them and 56 others?⁸² The cost is too high, in both civilian lives and the impact on the legitimacy of the coalition mission and the government of Afghanistan. It appears the Afghan Leadership has formed a perception that coalition concern over the potential of sustaining casualties places the lives of the local population at risk. These perceptions prompted the Minister of Defense to issue the following offer to mitigate this risk:

“... if you are [international community] worried about sustaining casualties, call the ANA. We're willing to accept the risk to ensure the reduction of civilian casualties.”⁸³

2. *Change the operational mandate of ISAF* to allow interaction with both MoD/ANA and MoI/ANP. The current restriction to provide support only to MoD undermines development of the ANP and impedes the ability of ISAF to meet mission requirements. Forces under command of USFOR-A have no such restrictions.

3. *Change the ANP role in security.* EUPOL currently espouses the ANP as the law enforcement and criminal investigation arm of the government, and trains them accordingly. CSTC-A equips and resources them to meet that mission. Afghanistan is at war, with threats both internal and external. Preparing the ANP as a “standard” police force, lightly armed, focused solely at criminal investigation and crime prevention sets the conditions for failure. The casualty count for the ANP in 2006/2007 (Solar Year (SY) 1385) was 1,802 (killed and wounded).⁸⁴ In the first six months of SY1386, the

casualty rate was already 2,874.⁸⁵ The ANP mission, training and equipping programs must change to develop them as a paramilitary force. Once Afghanistan is secure and stable, then revert to a more standard police mission and requirement. If the ANP continues to adhere to the direction EUPOL and CSTC-A is taking them, the casualty rates will continue to increase; they are the easy target.

More mentors [impacts security]

CSTC-A is critically under resourced; not in funding, but in ETT/PMT coverage. The command consistently operates below 50% fill of these assets. ISAF OMLTs that work in conjunction with ETTs are resourced at 74%⁸⁶. As the ANSF size and capability increase and as more security responsibility is transferred from ISAF to the ANSF the role of the mentor/trainer/advisor becomes takes on even more importance. Mentorship is the most effect answer to the biggest problem in the ANSF, leadership development. The ANSF is less than eight years in the making and still lacks competent leadership (at all levels). Only through focused mentoring and leader training will leaders develop and professional leadership evolve. Greater emphasis at filling the ETT/OMLT requirements is necessary.

Conclusion

To achieve success, the US and the international community must commit to more time and resources and develop ways to counter the affects of the narcotics trade and government corruption. The “ends” to America’s nation building efforts is a secure country with a sound economic base governed by a solid government where corruption is minimized, marginalized and criminalized. The “means” to achieving success is a viable legal system that is supported by an adequately sized, well-equipped, well trained

and well led Afghan Security Force, both army and police. The “way” to nation building success in Afghanistan is a well-coordinated international strategic development plan that focuses equally at development of security, the economic base and legitimate governance. Nation building in Afghanistan will succeed, provided the development of a secure environment, effective government, and a viable economy.

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